In Mexico remittances have long been used to compensate for the lack of coverage and quality of state-provided healthcare. Since the mid-2000s, however, those without insurance have been entitled to receive free healthcare via the Seguro Popular programme. While popular, the delivery of this scheme is highly localised and therefore vulnerable to political manipulation. Using a series of regression models based on data at the municipality level, this paper analyses all local elections in Mexico between 2010 and 2012 and the presidential election of 2012 to confirm results of the previous literature which found a negative relationship between remittances and voter turnout. However, the analysis reveals that the negative impact of remittances on turnout becomes larger with additional increases in the coverage of Seguro Popular, though only in those municipalities where the PRI (the former hegemonic party) is electorally strong. The evidence thus confirms that the discretionary character of welfare provision modulates the effect of remittances on turnout in sending municipalities, but only where party-based authoritarianism prevails.
Introduction
Mexico has a long tradition of distributing welfare benefits in a clientelist fashion (Fox, 1994; Middlebrook, 1995) .
1 Despite welfare being classified a citizenship right in the 1917 Mexican Constitution, social benefits (e.g. healthcare, pensions, maternity leave, housing loans, and other workers' benefits) had only been delivered to the rank-and-file of state-sponsored unions. This form of corporatist and clientelist delivery of public goods and services alongside coercion and repression enabled the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) to remain in power for more than seven decades. However, the electoral hegemony of the PRI began to be contested as the economy waned in the 1980s and 1990s. Successive economic downturns alongside the implementation of neoliberal reforms resulted in big cuts in social spending and growing masses of unemployed and of those working in the informal economy. Mounting dissidence was quickly followed by successive waves of social mobilisation against the government and subsequent cycles of electoral reforms. As the electoral playing field levelled, the PRI began losing more municipalities and governorships to opposition parties. It lost its majority in the lower house of the legislature in 1997 and the presidency for the first time in 2000. From 2000 to 2012, Mexico was consecutively ruled by two Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) governments for the first time in the country's history
Mexico's long transition from party-based authoritarianism was also accompanied by a surge in emigration to the United States (BBVA Bancomer & CONAPO, 2015, p. 37) . Between 1980 and 2000, the number of Mexican immigrants in the United States increased fourfold (from 2 million to 8.5 million). These increased international emigration flows saw remittance inflows grow more than fourteenfold between 1985 (BBVA Bancomer & CONAPO, 2015 . Presently, Mexico has one of the largest diaspora populations in the world, with nearly 12 million Mexicans living in the United States. 2 The country is also the fourth-largest recipient of remittances in the world (after India, China, and the Philippines) and the largest in Latin America. 3 It received 4.4 per cent of the global total of international remittance inflows and one-third of the Latin American total in 2015 (BBVA Bancomer & CONAPO, 2016, pp. 124 & 127) . Unsurprisingly, democratic regimes. However, in authoritarian regimes "the political subordination of clients is enduring and reinforced by the threat of coercion" (Fox, 2012, pp. 188 ).
2007; Taylor & Mora, 2006) . 7 Of those households receiving remittances, those without access to health programmes provided by state social security institutions are more likely to spend remittances on healthcare (Valero-Gil, 2008; Frank et. al., 2009) . In fact, according to Sana and Hu (2006) -who used MMP data -the lack of access to social security institutions (which provide free healthcare) encourages international emigration in Mexico. All this suggests that Mexican migrant households are more likely to be uninsured and therefore be reliant on remittances to cover healthcare expenses. In other words, remittances are used to cover gaps in the provision and quality of state healthcare in Mexico.
Mexico presently has the highest level of out-of-pocket spending on healthcare of all Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member countries (OECD, 2015) . However, in 2004, the universal right to healthcare was legalised in the Mexican Constitution. Although citizens are free to use private health services, the state is now responsible for providing healthcare to all Mexicans. In order to fulfil this obligation, the federal government implemented the Seguro Popular programme, which provides healthcare support to those who are unemployed, self-employed, or work outside the formal sector. Today, 45 per cent of the Mexican population is affiliated with this scheme. Despite the popularity of this state healthcare programme, its delivery is highly localised and therefore vulnerable to electoral manipulation.
However, according to various studies on Mexico, the incentives of voters to engage in clientelist transactions with political actors reduce with the additional income provided by remittances (Díaz-Cayeros, Weingast, & Magaloni, 2003; Pfutze, 2012; Escribà-Folch, Meseguer, & Wright, 2015) . By weakening clientelist links with the state, remittance inflows have arguably contributed to promote regime change in Mexico. Nonetheless, Mexico's democratisation remains uneven across the territory. Despite losing the presidency in 2000, the PRI continues ruling the majority of Mexico's states and municipalities. As a result, authoritarian enclaves (where clientelist practices are coupled with vote-buying and coercion) persist at the subnational level.
8 Moreover, as electoral democracy has proceeded in Mexico, clientelism has taken new forms and involves a greater range of 7 According to Airola (2007) , Mexican households receiving remittances spend 44 per cent more of their budget on healthcare than non-recipient households.
political actors (Hilgers, 2008; Luccisano & Macdonald, 2012) . It now mainly involves the delivery of social programmes for the poorest and the formerly uninsured (Serdán, 2006; Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, & Magaloni, 2006; Magaloni, Cayeros, & Estévez, forthcoming, p. Ch. 6; Bosch & Campos-Vázquez, 2014) .
In a country where (i) electoral participation has long been induced through the clientelist disbursement of state welfare (and other benefits), (ii) a large share of remittances are used by uninsured households to cover healthcare expenses, how does the expansion of large-scale state welfare programmes (like Seguro Popular) affect the incentives of remittance-recipient households to participate in elections?
Using a series of quantitative analyses based on aggregate data for all Mexican municipalities that held local elections in Mexico between 2010 and 2012 and participated in the presidential elections of 2012, this paper confirms that there is a negative relationship between remittances and voter turnout. Yet, the analysis reveals that under Seguro Popular the negative impact of remittances on voter turnout is larger -though only in municipalities where the PRI (the former hegemonic party) is electorally strong. The evidence suggests that the political manipulation (rather than the provision) of state welfare modulates the effect of remittances on voter turnout in sending municipalities, but only where party-based authoritarianism prevails.
The paper proceeds as follows: First, it briefly reviews the existing literature on remittances, turnout and clientelism in Mexico. Second, it describes the Seguro Popular programme. Third, it proposes a series of hypotheses regarding the impact of the delivery of the Seguro Popular scheme on the relationship between remittances and voter turnout. Fourth, it details the data and methods that are used for the analysis. Fifth, it presents the results through a series of statistical models. Sixth, it concludes with a discussion of results.
Literature review
What is the effect of international remittances on electoral participation rates in Mexico? Analysing aggregate data, Goodman and Hiskey (2008) find that voter turnout rates for the 2000 presidential election in Mexico are negatively associated with the percentage of households receiving remittances at the municipal level. They corroborate this finding with survey data showing that those living in Mexican towns with high levels of emigration are less likely to participate in elections regardless of whether or not they are involved in non-political community organisations. Using survey data collected in 10 rural communities in Michoacán, Mexico, Germano (2013) similarly shows that those dependent on international remittances are less likely to lobby local officials for economic assistance and therefore less likely to reward or punish the incumbent party in the 2006 presidential elections for poor economic performance. These findings are explained by the following argument: as emigrants become the main providers of public goods and safety nets, remittance recipients no longer have to rely on the state for economic assistance. Moreover, since they receive income from abroad, remittance recipients are less vulnerable to suffer from fluctuations in the national economy. As a result, they have fewer grievances against the government and therefore fewer incentives to vote and therefore reward or punish the incumbent party in elections.
At the same time, other studies demonstrate that, through their effect on income, remittance inflows helped (i) to alleviate many Mexicans' dependence on the PRI's old network of clientelism and state patronage and (ii) other opposition parties -namely, the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) and the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) -to win office in municipalities and states (Díaz-Cayeros, Weingast, and Magaloni, 2003; Pfutze, 2012; Escribà-Folch, Meseguer, and Wright, 2015) . In so doing, remittances arguably help to foster regime change in Mexico. If remittances help recipients to release themselves from the hold of clientelist practices (as these studies demonstrate), it is reasonable to expect that they have a negative effect on voter turnout rates in Mexico. In fact, according to some accounts, the unravelling of the PRI's clientelist machine at the local and national levels was due more so to growing electoral abstentionism in former PRI constituencies than to rising participation rates among the Mexican electorate (Moreno, 2003; .
9
Other accounts suggest that the relationship between remittances, clientelism and turnout is endogenous. For instance, using survey data collected after the 2006 presidential election in Mexico, Álvarez Mingote (2014) shows that remittance recipient voters are more likely to be courted through clientelistic tactics than voters not receiving remittances. 10 Thus, while remittances might lower recipients' 9 In Mexico voting is a political choice. Although voting is compulsory, non-voters are not sanctioned and people are free to register to vote. In 1994, the rate of abstention in presidential elections was 23 per cent, whereas in 2000, that figure was 40 percent (Moreno, 2012, p. 574) . However, since the ousting of the PRI from the presidency, rates of electoral participation in presidential elections have remained virtually unchanged (INE, 2015) . 10 Based on evidence from the Middle East, Ahmed (2012) similarly argues that, as the public pressure on governments to deliver public goods and services lowers due to
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Copyright @ 2016 REMITTANCES REVIEW © Transnational Press London incentives to demand welfare benefits or economic assistance from the state, or engage in clientelist practices with political actors, and therefore decrease the likelihood of participating in elections, they can also increase politicians' incentives to use clientelism in order to court those abstaining, who in turn happen to be those receiving remittances.
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The relationship between remittances, clientelism and turnout becomes more complex once we consider that clientelism has taken new forms and involves a greater range of political actors as electoral democracy has proceeded in Mexico. Clientelism is less evident and coercive than during the heyday of the PRI but still pervasive and widespread in Mexican politics. 12 It mainly involves the delivery of social programmes for those formerly uninsured.
Although the political manipulation of state welfare was common during PRI rule, there is evidence that the PAN governments of Vicente Fox (2000 Fox ( -2006 and Felipe Calderón (2006 used social programmes to reward PAN strongholds or improving the electoral performance of the presidential ruling party (Serdán, 2006; Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, & Magaloni, 2006; Magaloni, Cayeros, & Estévez, forthcoming, p. Ch. 6; De la O, 2013; Bosch & Campos-Vázquez, 2014) . While the rural poor were targeted through conditional cash programmes during neoliberal PRI governments, it was not until the PAN gained the presidential office that formerly marginalised constituencies (including the urban poor, the unemployed, and those working in the informal sector) began to receive social benefits from the state. Of the welfare programmes implemented by the two PAN presidencies, the expansion of Seguro Popular is probably the most noteworthy.
growing remittances, governments are more likely to divert public resources towards clientelistic and patronage networks.
11 Over the past decade, courting those receiving remittances from abroad has become a common practice in Mexico for electoral candidates running at both the national and subnational levels. Reaching emigrants abroad and their families at home has gained salience. For instance, Mexico legalised dual citizenship and extraterritorial voting in presidential elections in 2012. Moreover, currently, citizens based abroad can vote in the gubernatorial contests in 13 of the 32 Mexican states: Baja California Sur, Chiapas, Coahuila, Colima, Distrito Federal, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Jalisco, Michoacán, Morelos, Puebla, Yucatán, and Zacatecas 12 The Mexico 2012 Panel Study reports that 7.7 per cent of those surveyed reported having been directly exposed to some form of vote buying. However, 63 per cent of respondents believe that politicians frequently try to buy votes in their home communities, while 62 per cent think that many members of their communities sell their votes (Nichter & Palmer-Rubin, 2015, pp. 201-202) . According to polls conducted by Parametría and Alianza Cívica in 2012, 24 per cent and 28.4 per cent of those surveyed, respectively, had been exposed to electoral malpractices (Serra, 2015, pp. 63, 66 ).
Yet, we know little about the ways in which the relationship between remittances, clientelism and turnout unfolded after the PRI was ousted from the presidency for the first time. Focusing on the Seguro Popular healthcare scheme, this paper aims to contribute to the literature by examining whether and in what ways state welfare programmes mediate the effect of remittances on voter turnout across Mexican municipalities.
Seguro Popular
Seguro Popular provides healthcare support to those who are unemployed, underemployed or work outside the formal sector. It covers a range of medical interventions and provides free access to medications and clinical tests associated with 95 per cent of the country's total disease burden (which are contained in the Fund for Protection against Catastrophic Expenses). Affiliation is voluntary and not conditional on age, health status, or pre-existing illnesses. However, applicants cannot be registered with any other social security institutions. Since 2010 Mexican migrants have been able to enrol themselves and their families from consulates abroad, 13 whereas returnees and deported migrants can, obviously, request affiliation with the programme locally. Although all families who are beneficiaries are required to pay a subsidised annual fee (provided that they are not among the 40 per cent poorest households in the country), in practice, very few households pay this premium.
The implementation of this programme developed in stages. It was first introduced in 2001 in Colima, Jalisco, Aguascalientes, Tabasco, and Campeche. By 2005, however, it was active in all 32 Mexican states. The number of people enrolled in the programme jumped from 1 million in 2001 to 52.6 million in 2012. In effect, the number of people registered with Seguro Popular is now double the number affiliated with the Mexican Social Security Institute. Seguro Popular led to an increase in total public health expenditure as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) from 2.6 per cent in 2000 to 3.2 percent in 2013 (OECD, 2015) . Also, the range of benefits offered by the programme has expanded over time: the scheme covered 91 medical procedures in 2003 compared to 266 in 2012. More importantly, various studies show that Seguro Popular has contributed to reducing out-of-pocket expenditures for many Mexicans (King, et. al., 2009; Barros, 2009; Barofsky, 2011; Sosa-Rubí, Salinas-Rodríguez, & Galárraga, 2011) . According to OECD estimates, out-of-pocket spending in health in Mexico has declined by 55 per cent, since 2004, which is mainly due to this growing state intervention (Frenk, Knaul, Gomez, & Gonzalez, 2012) .
While participation in the programme does not imply affiliation to any party, Seguro Popular far from delivers benefits in a non-discretionary manner. According to some accounts, the initial expansion of Seguro Popular was not correlated to levels of economic development or need, health necessities, size of the informal economy, or average wages in a municipality (Barros, 2009; Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, & Magaloni, 2006; Azuara & Marinescu, 2011; Aterido, HallwardDriemeier, & Pages, 2010) . For instance, Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni (2006) show that the programme first achieved full coverage in smaller states, which enabled the Fox government to praise itself for achieving universal coverage in certain states in an attempt to influence the 2006 presidential election. However, expansion of the programme was slower in those states governed by the PRD, whose candidate, Andres Manuel López Obrador, was one of the frontrunners in the 2006 presidential election. Bosch and Campos-Vázquez (2014) also demonstrate that there was a positive correlation between the party affiliation of governors and municipalities with regard to the implementation of Seguro Popular. In fact, despite the obligation of the Mexican state to provide free healthcare to all its citizens, there is significant variation in the coverage and spending of Seguro Popular, as well as the criteria used to allocate benefits, across Mexico's states and municipalities.
To date, irregularities in the allocation of Seguro Popular benefits have been denounced in 30 of the country's 32 states. These anomalies include a lack of monitoring or evaluation of the programme results, no transparency in the allocation of funds, no reliable registry of the people enrolled, premium charges for people who qualify as poor, exemptions for families who do not qualify as poor, diversion of funds, and so on and so forth (CNN Mexico, 2012d; Bosch, Cobacho, & Pagés, 2012; Escobar Latapí & González de la Rocha, 2012) . These problems might owe to the centralised structure of state revenues in Mexico, where federal funds are allocated to municipalities provided the state legislatures give their approval (Cabrero Mendoza, 2000; Barraca, 2005; Turner, 2004) . In this setting those states and municipalities that belong to the same party frequently collude in the distribution of state assistance for electoral purposes (Aparicio & Meseguer, 2012; Simpser, Duquette-Rury, Hernandez Company, Ibarra, & F., 2016; González Hernández & González Hernández, 2011; Salazar, 2007; Edmonds-Poli, 2006) . This is possible because despite Seguro Popular being financed by the federal government, state authorities are charged with administering (and therefore allocating the use of) these funds, while municipal authorities are responsible for delivering health services. The scheme is also vulnerable to electoral manipulation at both the national and subnational level due to Mexico's staggered electoral calendar 14 and the lack of restriction restrictions on the programme's coverage and spending during electoral years.
Overall, Seguro Popular has succeeded in mitigating the out-ofpocket expenditure of those it insures but is highly vulnerable to discretionary management and political manipulation.
Research Hypotheses
If migrant households are commonly uninsured and spend an important share of international remittances on healthcare in Mexico, on the one hand, and remittances have important effects on the incentives for recipients to vote and engage in clientelist transactions, on the other hand, how does Seguro Popular affect the impact of international remittances on voter turnout?
Assuming that international remittances have a negative effect on turnout in Mexico (as argued in the existing literature), there are three possible scenarios:
1) The negative impact of remittances on voter turnout rates weakens as coverage of Seguro Popular increases.
This scenario suggests that the relationship between remittances and turnout is related to the absence or coverage of free healthcare. In this case, Seguro Popular might have a positive effect on migrant households' disposable income by reducing out-of-pocket expenditure on healthcare of migrant households, which means a (larger) share of remittances can be spent on other purposes (such as education, housing, land, real estate, savings, or business ventures). This in turn improves the material well-being and minimises the risks of future poverty of those receiving remittances. Given these gains, it is plausible to expect that remittance recipient households that have access to state healthcare benefits are more likely to reward the incumbent party with votes. By contrast, uninsured households have to provide for their own healthcare with remittance inflows. Thereby, they might be less likely to mobilise in support of or develop attachments to the incumbent party and fewer incentives to vote. This reasoning is in line with Germano's (2013) and Goodman and Hiskey's (2008) arguments.
2) The negative impact of remittances on voter turnout rates grows as the coverage of Seguro Popular increases.
This scenario indicates that the relationship between remittances and voter turnout is primarily related to the non-programmatic distribution of state healthcare (not to the lack of provision per se). This is a reasonable expectation if we take into account concerns about the discretionary character of Seguro Popular and the continuation and pluralisation of clientelist practices in Mexico. In this context remittance recipients are more likely to abstain because they are less susceptible to the financial punishment that usually accompanies clientelist practices, given the additional income provided by remittances. This line of reasoning thus follows the arguments put forward by Díaz-Cayeros, Weingast, & Magaloni, 2003 , Pfutze (2012 ), and Escribà-Folch, Meseguer, and Wright (2015 . Moreover, remittance recipients might be more reluctant to reward the party that delivers welfare benefits with votes because of the social and political remittances they receive from their family and friends living abroad, including democratic ideas, values and practices (Levitt & Lamba-Nieves, 2011) .
3) The impact of remittances on voter turnout is not affected by increases in the coverage of Seguro Popular.
This scenario suggests that factors other than the lack of state welfare provision or the prevalence of clientelism in the distribution of public goods and services affect the impact of international remittances on voter turnout, such as the extent of democratisation in emigrants' home municipalities.
Research Design
In order to test these claims, this study employs a subnational comparative design. Mexico is a three-tiered federal democracy, in which municipalities are the basic unit. Municipalities vary widely in terms political and economic development. Working with municipalities will thus supply us with a considerably large number of observations, offer greater variation in the variables of interest, and therefore enable us to draw better inferences. For the present analysis, data was compiled for all Mexican municipalities that held local elections between 2010 and 2012 and participated in the 2012 presidential election. Ideally, the propositions advanced in this study could be tested using tailored household survey data that allow for the identification of those households that receive remittances, those households that are enrolled in the Seguro Popular programme, and households' patterns of electoral participation. Although there is very good survey data on migrant households in Mexico (such as that from the MMP), such data are based on snowball sampling and are thus not representative of all Mexican states, and, therefore, tend to favour traditional migrant regions in the west of the country. Possible alternative data sources are the Americas Barometer and the Mexico Panel Study; however, neither of these provides information on whether respondents are enrolled in the Seguro Popular. Thus, the individual-level data that are currently available do not enable us to examine the ways in which Seguro Popular coverage modulates the relationship between international remittances and voter turnout in Mexico. For that reason, this study is based on aggregate-level data.
It would also have been ideal to use pooled time-series cross-sectional data to examine how Seguro Popular coverage affects the strength and direction of the impact of remittances on voter turnout rates. However, because the relevant municipal-level data on migration and socio-economic indicators are only gathered every 10 years, I had to limit the analysis to the cross-sectional level.
As for the estimation strategy, regression models include state dummies to capture otherwise unobserved heterogeneity that varies across Mexican states. 16 Observations from municipalities are likely to be correlated within states because (1) until 2015, subnational contests were organised by state electoral institutions every three years, (2) state governments are charged with allocating Seguro Popular federal funds across municipalities, and (3) state characteristics can affect the availability of state healthcare programmes in a municipality. I use robust standard errors in all of the models in order to account for further heteroscedasticity.
Since the proportion of households receiving remittances is not a random population, there is a risk that the models will capture the selection of remittances and the effects of remittances in one parameter. To address this, I use an instrumental variable that enables the prediction of the random assignment of remittances but does not directly influence voter turnout.
All estimations were conducted using R. The packages AER, plm, and stargazer were employed. 
Dependent Variables

Independent Variables
Remittances are measured by the percentage of households in a municipality which reported having received remittances from abroad during the period 2005-2010.
In order to account for the proportion of households receiving remittances, the lagged value of this endogenous regressor is used as an instrument.
Remittances (2000) measures the share of households receiving remittances from abroad in a municipality in 2000. The logic is that the share of households receiving remittances in the present is likely to be larger in those municipalities where large shares of households were already receiving remittances in 2000. Although remittances and voter turnout might be related, unobserved shocks that affect participation in the elections today might be unrelated to the proportion of households receiving remittances more than a decade ago.
State Healthcare
Seguro Popular is the share of the total population of a municipality that was enrolled in the Seguro Popular health scheme during the election years.
Control variables
Political variables
Concurrent elections is a dummy variable that is coded 1 if elections coincided with other electoral processes at the other levels and 0 otherwise. It includes dummies for concurrent elections at the federal level, at the gubernatorial level, and the municipal level. is included because when elections are concurrent, there is more awareness and information about the contests; therefore, citizens are more likely to vote (Geys, 2006, p. 652) .
Margin of victory is the difference between the share of votes obtained by the winning party/coalition and the runner-up party/coalition. The logic behind using this variable is that when electoral races are close, the probability of one vote influencing the overall outcome of an election is higher. As a result, the expected utility of voting increases, and, consequently, the incentives to vote are bigger. Close elections might also promote voting because they demand that political parties and elites undertake more campaigning and mobilisation efforts in order to tilt the electoral balance in their favour. The more information there is about the candidates and political parties, the more likely citizens are to vote (Geys, 2006, pp. 646-647) .
Effective number of political parties consists of the inverse of the Herfindahl index. It is included given that the magnitude of the margin of victory depends on the number of contending parties or coalitions.
Herfindahl index is the sum of the vote shares obtained by all competing parties squared. It ranges from 0 to 1, with higher levels indicating a decrease in electoral competition and lower levels indicating the opposite.
Party affiliation of mayor/governor is a dummy variable that indicates the party affiliation of the mayor or governor at the time of elections. It is included in order to control for the allocation of Seguro Popular based on political considerations.
Shared partisanship is a dummy variable that is coded 1 when the mayor and state governor belong to the same party and 0 otherwise. It is included in order to control for the likelihood of collusion in the allocation of Seguro Popular between authorities at different levels.
Electoral strength measures the share of votes obtained by the main parties in municipal and presidential elections. This variable is included in order to account for party strongholds.
Socio-economic and demographic variables
Population size is the number of inhabitants in each municipality. It is included because (assuming that voters are instrumentally rational) the probability that an individual's vote will be decisive decreases as population size increases (Geys, 2006, pp. 642-643) . Given the wide variation in population size across the municipalities included in the sample, the population size logarithm is included in the regression models.
Population density is measured as the total size of the population divided by the area of the municipality measured in squared kilometres. It is included to distinguish between rural and urban areas. This is important because in densely populated communities, interactions between parties and voters are occasional and impersonal, which means that urban-area voters have less knowledge about politicians and, in turn, fewer incentives for turning out. However, this view is contested by other scholars, who argue that cities are more attractive locations for political parties to campaign (Geys, 2006, pp. 643-644) . To control for these factors, the population density logarithm is included in the regression models.
Levels of human development is based on the Human Development Index (HDI), which is the mean of three normalised indices that measure the following dimensions of development: infant mortality rate, GDP per capita, and mean years of schooling. This indicator ranges from 0 to 100. The reason for using this variable is that as individuals' income and education levels increase, they become better informed about politics and therefore more likely to participate in elections (Brady, Verba, & Scholzman, 1995) .
Rate of homicide is the number of homicides per 1,000 habitants. It should be noted that during the period under study (2010) (2011) (2012) , Mexico experienced an escalation in drug-related violence, which some argue might have influenced voter turnout (Trelles & Carreras, 2012) . This variable is included because homicides rates are correlated with violent crimes, like kidnapping, assault, and gang violence. For presidential contests, the variable measures the official homicide rate six months prior to the date of the election. For municipal contests, it measures the official homicide rate during the year of election.
Descriptive Statistics
Tables 1 and 2 present the summary statistics for the variables included in the models estimating voter turnout rates in municipal elections and presidential elections, respectively. It can be seen that between 2005 and 2010, the average share of households in every municipality receiving remittances was 6.5 (ranging between 0 per cent and 48.7 per cent).
In 2012, the average turnout for the presidential elections was 64.7 per cent (ranging between 0 per cent and 94.5 per cent). In that year, the average proportion of people affiliated with Seguro Popular in every municipality was 68.8 per cent (ranging between 0 per cent and 94.5 per cent). Meanwhile, the average voter turnout rate in the municipal elections held between 2010 and 2012 was 66.23 per cent (ranging between 0 per cent and 98 per cent). Results Table 3 reports the coefficients of the estimates from two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation when using data from municipal elections. Table A .1 in the Appendix presents the estimates that were obtained by using ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. A quick comparison between the estimates in Tables 3 and A.1 reveal that the coefficient of remittances increases in absolute value after instrumenting, which is consistent with the point that remittances are endogenous and that the instrumented variable does what it is supposed to do. Therefore, only the estimates obtained using 2SLS are reported below.
As seen in Model 1 in Table 3 , the proportion of households receiving remittances has a negative and statistically significant effect on voter turnout in municipal elections. For every ten-unit increase in the proportion of households receiving remittances, the voter turnout rate in municipal elections falls by 7.1 points. Meanwhile, electoral participation rates at the municipal level are positively associated with Seguro Popular coverage. For every ten-unit increase in Seguro Popular coverage, the voter turnout rate in municipal elections increases 6.8 points. These findings are consistent with previous studies. Since the aim of this paper is to examine how Seguro Popular coverage affects the effect of international remittances on voter turnout, an interaction term between Seguro Popular and remittan- ces is included in the models. However, this interaction term is not significant in any specification. As for other variables, it can be seen that voter turnout is positively related to the closeness of elections (which is measured by the margin of victory), but is negatively affected by the homicide rate and the size of the population. Voter turnout is also higher in those municipalities where the governor belongs to the PRI, and municipal elections are concurrent with other contests.
In all the above specifications, the instrumental variable used (proportion of households that received remittances in a municipality in 2000) passes the 'weak instruments' and the 'Wu-Hausman' tests that test the strength of the instrument and the consistency of the 2SLS estimation as compared to OLS, respectively. 19
The previous results suggest that the impact of international remittances on voter turnout in municipal elections is unaffected by the coverage of Seguro Popular. However, to further examine this possibility, Models in Table 4 include a series of three-way interactions in order to test whether the impact of Seguro Popular on the relationship between remittances and electoral turnout systematically varies across municipalities. To begin with, we should bear in mind that Seguro Popular has been criticised for the poor quality of the health service. For instance, despite the coverage of Seguro Popular increasing over the years, public spending on the medical infrastructure and medical staff has remained constant during the same period (CNN Mexico, 2012b; Fuentes, 2014) . Also, various studies confirm that migrant households continue using remittances to cover healthcare expenditures despite being affiliated with Seguro Popular (Frank, et al., 2009; Valero, 2008; Ochoa Lupián & Ayvar Campos, 2015; González-Block, De la Sierra-De la Vega, & Vargas-Bustamante, 2013) . To account for this, Model 1 in Table 4 includes three-way interactions between remittances, Seguro Popular, and the number of doctors per medical unit. However, the triple interaction term is insignificant.
Since the quality of health services can also be affected by the level of development of each municipality, Model 2 in Table 4 includes three-way interactions between remittances, Seguro Popular, and the HDI. But human development levels do not appear to affect Seguro Popular's impact on the relationship between remittances and voter turnout either. Considering that the allocation and delivery of Seguro Popular might be based on electoral calculations, Model 3 Table 4 includes three-way interactions between Seguro Popular, remittances, and the effective number of political parties. Yet, the effect of Seguro Popular on the relationship between remittances and voter turnout does not vary with the effective number of political parties either. Similarly, Model 4 in Table 4 includes three-way interactions between Seguro Popular, remittances, and the margin of victory in elections. However, this triple interaction term is also not significant. Additionally, the character of the delivery of Seguro Popular can be affected by the collusion between mayors and governors. To account for this, Model 5 in Table 4 includes three-way interaction terms between remittances, Seguro Popular, and shared partisanship between mayors and governors. However, Seguro Popular's impact on the relationship between remittances and voter turnout does not differ across municipalities, irrespective of whether the mayor and the governor belong to the same party or not.
Since the delivery of Seguro Popular might differ across those subnational entities governed by the presidential party (the PAN) and those governed by other parties, Model 1 in Table 5 includes threeway interactions between Seguro Popular, remittances, and dummy variables indicating the incumbent party at the municipal level. However, the impact of Seguro Popular on the relationship between remittances and voter turnout does not differ across those municipalities governed by the presidential party (the PAN) and those governed by other parties. Model 2 in Table 5 includes three-way interactions between Seguro Popular, remittances, and PAN vote shares in the municipal elections. But, the electoral strength of the PAN was found to have no significant effect on Seguro Popular's impact on the relationship between remittances and voter turnout either.
Nevertheless, it can be seen in Model 3 in Table 5 that the Seguro Popular's effect on the relationship between voter turnout and remittances differs in those municipalities governed by the PRI. Accordingly, in those municipalities ruled by the PRI, additional increases in the share of the people affiliated to Seguro Popular magnify the negative effect of the proportion of households receiving remittances on voter turnout rates. Model 4 in Table 5 confirms that the Seguro Popular's effect on the relationship between voter turnout and remittances varies with the electoral strength of the PRI. Accordingly, as the share of votes obtained by the PRI in a municipality increases, the negative effect of the proportion of households receiving remittances on voter turnout rates becomes stronger with additional rises in the share of the people affiliated to Seguro Popular.
As noted above, clientelist practices are no longer exclusively practised by the PRI; though it is the party most often accused of such activities. For instance, according to the Mexico 2012 Panel Study, 31 per cent of respondents identified the PRI as the party that offers material favours in exchange for votes; 18 per cent, the PRD; and 9 per cent, the PAN (Nichter & Palmer-Rubin, 2015) . However, an exit poll conducted by Alianza Cívica shows that 71 per cent of voters exposed to some form of vote coercion or buying attributed these practices to the PRI; 17 per cent, to the PAN; and 9 per cent, to the PRD (Montalvo, 2012). Thereby, in PRI strongholds clientelist practices are more likely to coexist with coercion and repression. Thus, findings indicate that the impact of international remittances on voter turnout p ** p *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include controls for population size (log), population density(log), human development index, and homicide rates is not modulated by the lack of welfare provision in the home municipalities of emigrants. Instead, findings suggest that in municipalities where the PRI is electorally strong (or where partybased authoritarianism persist) the expansion of state welfare programmes (like Seguro Popular) magnifies the negative impact of international remittances on voter turnout. Results thus suggest that the relationship between remittances and voter turnout is related to the pervasiveness of clientelism in the distribution of state welfare programmes, but this is only consequential in those municipalities where the former hegemonic party electorally prevails.
As noted above, clientelist practices are no longer exclusively practised by the PRI; though it is the party most often accused of such activities. For instance, according to the Mexico 2012 Panel Study, 31 per cent of respondents identified the PRI as the party that offers material favours in exchange for votes; 18 per cent, the PRD; and 9 per cent, the PAN (Nichter & Palmer-Rubin, 2015) . However, an exit poll conducted by Alianza Cívica shows that 71 per cent of voters exposed to some form of vote coercion or buying attributed these practices to the PRI; 17 per cent, to the PAN; and 9 per cent, to the PRD (Montalvo, 2012) . Thereby, in PRI strongholds clientelist practices are more likely to coexist with coercion and repression. Thus, findings indicate that the impact of international remittances on voter turnout is not modulated by the lack of welfare provision in the home municipalities of emigrants. Instead, findings suggest that in municipalities where the PRI is electorally strong (or where partybased authoritarianism persist) the expansion of state welfare programmes (like Seguro Popular) magnifies the negative impact of international remittances on voter turnout. Results thus suggest that the relationship between remittances and voter turnout is related to the pervasiveness of clientelism in the distribution of state welfare programmes, but this is only consequential in those municipalities where the former hegemonic party electorally prevails.
Before proceeding, we should bear in mind that in Mexico popular elections are held at different levels of government and not all Mexican municipalities hold municipal elections. Also, there are important variations in the integrity of elections across the subnational and national levels in Mexico (Serra, 2015) , which can additionally influence voter turnout (Carreras & Irepoglu, 2012) . In order to test the above results, I reran the models using data from the presidential election of 2012. Table 6 reports the estimates when using 2SLS. Again, the instrument used is the proportion of households that received international remittances in 2000. For comparison purposes, Table A .2 in the Appendix presents the estimates that were obtained using OLS.
As reported in Table 6 , the proportion of households receiving international remittances is again negatively associated with voter turnout in the 2012 presidential election. Also, the proportion of habitants affiliated with Seguro Popular is positively and significantly related to the rate of electoral participation. But, the interaction term between the proportion of households receiving remittances and the proportion of inhabitants affiliated with Seguro Popular is insignificant. With regards to other variables, voter turnout in the presidential election is again higher in those municipalities where there are concurrent elections and where the state governor belongs to the PRI. The size of the population and the homicide rate are again negatively related to the dependent variable. However, levels of human development are positively related to voter turnout in the presidential election.
To repeat the above analysis, I include a series of 3-way interactions. As seen in Table 7 , the effect of Seguro Popular coverage on the relationship between remittances and turnout in the 2012 presidential election does not differ with the number of doctors per medical unit or the level of human development (Models 1 and 2). Similarly, the effect of Seguro Popular on the relationship between remittances and voter turnout in the 2012 presidential election does not differ with the shared partisanship of mayors and governors (Model 3). Likewise, the impact of Seguro Popular on the relationship between remittances and voter turnout does not vary with the share dispersion of votes among political parties, as measured by the Herfindahl Index (Model 4).
It can be seen in Table 8 Thus, using data from elections held at different levels of analysis, the statistical exercise reveals that the negative effect that remittances have on turnout in a municipality becomes larger as Seguro Popular coverage increases, but only in those municipalities where the PRI is electorally strong. All this reveals that the impact of remittances on voter turnout is not mediated by the lack (or coverage) of welfare provision but rather by the political manipulation of it, though only in those municipalities where clientelist practices are more likely to coexist with vote buying and coercion against voters. 
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper examines whether and in what ways the coverage of Seguro Popular (a large-scale state healthcare programme) affects the strength and direction of the relationship between international remittances and voter turnout. Through a series of regression models based on data for all the Mexican municipalities which held municipal elections between 2010 and 2012 and participated in the 2012 presidential election, this analysis confirms previous studies' finding that international remittances are negatively related to voter turnout. However, it reveals that this negative effect becomes larger as Seguro Popular coverage increases -though only in those municipalities where the PRI is electorally strong. These findings hold for municipal elections and the 2012 presidential contest and are valid after controlling for a series of variables.
While accusations of clientelism have gone against all parties in the system, the majority of them have gone against the PRI (Nichter & Palmer-Rubin, 2015) . Also, the PRI is the party with the largest number of accusations of vote-buying and coercion against voters (Montalvo, 2012) . In these municipalities, the expansion and provision of state welfare programmes (like Seguro Popular) are more likely to be perceived by citizens as strategies for buying political loyalties and therefore upholding authoritarian enclaves. Thus, the evidence presented here suggests that the political manipulation -rather than the lack -of state welfare provision modulates the relationship between international remittances and voter turnout, but only where authoritarian practices like vote-buying and coercion are persistent. This finding lends support to those accounts that link international remittances to the decline in incentives for recipients to engage in clientelist practices and reduced turnout for ruling parties in partybased settings (Pfutze, 2012; Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, & Magaloni, 2003; Escribà-Folch, Meseguer, & Wright, 2015) . Distinguishing between political regimes at the subnational level can thus provide us with a better understanding of the intricate relationship between state clientelism, remittances and voter turnout in Mexico, where transition from one-party authoritarianism remains an uneven and incomplete process.
Of course, this study has various limitations. Future research should revise the claims advanced here by developing new hypotheses and using new data, if possible at the individual and household level. Ethnographic accounts could also shed further light on the claims of this study. An interesting direction for future research might be to examine how international remittances interact with the provision of state welfare when affecting other types of political participation, like protests, lobbying, or town hall meetings (Dionne, Inman, & Montinola, 2014) . Future studies should also examine whether the propositions of this study hold in other sending countries that have recently made transitions from party-based authoritarianism. Although there is still much to be done, the results of this study hopefully shed further light on the complex intersection between state welfare, international remittances and electoral participation. 
